

Way forward for agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa

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ABSTRACT

This review article argues that rural sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from a wide range of disadvantages that have stunted its agricultural development. Agricultural areas have been characterised by policy voids and neglect, and have failed to achieve sustained development. A lack of incentives, rural investments, and institutional support has hobbled African farmers. Any way forward for the agricultural areas will rest on decisively tackling rural poverty. Many analysts have remarked on the debilitating effects of traditional tenure whereby most Africans do not hold secure title to the land they farm. Land tenure reform must be coupled with the pursuit of the best that modern technology and research has to offer. African farmers are also seriously disadvantaged by the subsidies that developed nations pay their farmers. A renewed commitment to a more open trading regime between Africa and its main trading partners is a sine qua non for Africa to prosper. In essence, for Africa fully to realise its agricultural potential it needs urgently to transcend the methods and cultural institutions of its past even though this may entail something of a shock to the system and alienate certain vested interests. But this cannot happen without political stability and good governance.

INTRODUCTION

Kenneth Kaunda said that was he to be president of Zambia again he would make agriculture his main priority (Mills 2010:209). Africa has been dubbed the *sleeping giant* of agriculture and “the World Bank... has recently been talking up farming’s potential for leading economic growth” in Africa (Rice 2011:137). This article serves as a point of departure for thinking about how the revitalisation of Africa’s rural agricultural areas might be achieved. It advocates the use of political and social change to create a platform from which technological progress can affect the necessary transformation. It is heartening to see Africa described as “becoming a rich and diverse breeding ground for innovations in agriculture” (Halweil and

Nierenberg 2011:3) but much remains to be done to ensure that the fruits of this innovation are sustained. According to Mills (2010:3): “Far from being the world’s breadbasket, Africa’s agricultural potential has... been squandered... 35 of 48 sub-Saharan economies were net food importers at the end of the 2000s... [and] Africa’s share of world agricultural exports has halved since 1970”.

The discussion opens with a look at what characterises developing countries in general and then hones in to an account of rural Africa in particular. After a brief overview of the mixed track record of state policy in Africa, and the fallout it has had for rural life, the analysis turns to the heart of the matter. This consists in factors that arguably have the potential to jumpstart sub-Saharan Africa’s largely underperforming agricultural sectors by freeing the potential that is presently *locked-up* in these economies’ rural hinterlands.

The argument revolves primarily around extracting full leverage from the enormous catalytic value of private property rights. Titled property must be seen in a new light – as a source of positive economic multipliers. As an adjunct to this assertion the critical need for embracing the best that science and technology has to offer is argued for. The downstream implications of these ideas are then briefly drawn out in a tentative way forward for Africa’s agricultural areas that transcends mere income redistribution and that embraces the tenets of free trade.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although a universally accepted *definition* of a *developing country* is something that will probably remain forever elusive, there should be no especial difficulty with a *description* of a typical developing country. Such a description would *ipso facto* result in a list of characteristics nearly all of which would be clustered around the notion of a country that has yet to meet its full potential. This implies a country where the levels of deprivation are unacceptably high. In what respects do developing countries typically fall short of what they could be?

First and foremost one should consider the different criteria that are required to form the various indices of development as detailed by Todaro (1997). The predominant variables are invariably economic, whether this be Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), or income *per capita* as measured against some or other pre-determined poverty line or standard.

It has long been realised that grading countries on economic criteria alone is too simplistic, and furthermore that it is susceptible to distortions. An extreme case in point, in the African context, is oil-rich Equatorial Guinea which ranked 120 on the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) rankings – one place higher than South Africa – but which would have fallen by 90 places to position 210 were its unevenly distributed GDP *per capita* stripped out of the calculation (UNDP 2006).

Thus it is that the HDI goes beyond mere GDP and incorporates life expectancy, school enrolments, and literacy rates, while the UNDP also has indices for crimes against persons, human rights, gender inequality, spending on health, income inequality and so forth. Developing countries, it will be found, usually fall short of the ideal, to a greater or lesser degree, on a whole range of these criteria, but what is important to note is that these



criteria are invariably both cause and effect to one another. This is to say that they tend to be mutually reinforcing, for better or for worse, and should not, therefore, be considered in isolation. This is of particular importance when one has to consider the potential ways forward for the rural areas in Africa.

Typically then, one would be hard put to improve upon Todaro's (1997:27) characterisation of developing countries as being afflicted by:

[W]idespread and chronic absolute poverty, high and rising levels of unemployment and underemployment, wide and growing disparities in the distribution of income, low and stagnating levels of agricultural productivity, sizable and growing imbalances between urban and rural levels of living and economic opportunities, serious and worsening environmental decay, antiquated and inappropriate educational and health systems, severe balance of payments and international debt problems, and substantial and increasing dependence on foreign and often inappropriate technologies, institutions and value systems.

There is something wrong with Todaro's rather depressing litany however. "Rising levels of unemployment", "growing disparities", "growing imbalances", "worsening environmental decay" [own emphases] and so forth hardly bespeak a *developing* country. Instead this reads like a description of countries that are going rapidly downhill. But, for all that his prognosis seems unduly gloomy. Todaro does identify most of the elements that come into play. One might want to add poor telecommunications and physical infrastructure to the list, however, along with seriously deficient governance in many cases. These last-mentioned factors all have particular resonance for rural agricultural areas as will become evident later in this discussion.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RURAL AREAS

It seems that no discussion that deals with rural areas can escape a digression into the highly contested terrain of what constitutes *rural*. Is the South African Free State's densely populated QwaQwa region, for instance, rural or urban? One reads of *peri-urban* areas. Should these more appropriately be known as *semi-rural*? Can it be said of the ex-farmworker in-migrants to the small country towns that they are *urbanising*? (Atkinson and Marais 2006). Whatever the case, for the purposes of this article, *rural* will be regarded as being everything that is not obviously urban, although *rural* will later be refined to become synonymous with *agricultural*, when the economic factors that affect these areas are discussed.

Modern so-called *knowledge economy* societies have generally progressed from agricultural/pastoral origins to their current status via a phase of industrialisation. Perhaps for this reason one cannot help noticing, especially in developing contexts, that rural people sometimes seem to suffer from an inferiority complex. It would appear that those who remain rural are those who failed to graduate to an urban environment. Although there seems no compelling reason why this logic should not apply in reverse, the fact is that urbanites have since time immemorial exhibited a sense of superiority over their *country cousins*. The Latin word *rustici* ('people from the countryside') was used as a pejorative term in Roman times (Bragg 2010) and this is reflected in the well known phenomenon of *urban*

bias. What urbanites all too easily forget though (until one day there is nothing to buy at the grocery store) is that they cannot eat knowledge. Neither can they eat the products of industrialisation save where these consist in *value-add* to rural produce. And this is the rural areas' advantage – the rural can survive without the urban (subsistence) but the urban cannot even subsist without the rural. In addition to this, the agricultural sector's outputs "also mitigate development risks" by enabling people in the cities to "engage in activities other than subsistence". According to Mill (2010:162) "this is the genesis of industrialisation and economic diversification".

So what characterises these vital areas in developing countries? Sadly, this can be summed up in one word – *neglect* and this is because the locus of political and economic power is invariably urban-based. Indeed Rukuni (2011:207) characterises this oversight as being one of the African nations' "most serious post-independence errors of judgement". Mills (2010:89) describes post-independence African development policies as having been positively *anti-agrarian*—only four percent of development aid, and a derisory one percent of African national budgets, have been awarded to the agricultural sector on average. An aggravating factor, especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, is that for many countries their concept of *nationhood* is still in the process of developing (Chabal 2002; Hugon 2004). Twineyo-Kamugisha (2012:31,33) remarking on the pervasive "lack of a shared national identity" says that "most Africans have little commitment to their countries" and according to Clarke (2012:157), "Modern Africa is not really 'modern' at all". What this often entails for these countries' agriculturalists is that, uncaptured by modernity's characteristic processes of documentation (Foucauldian 'discipline'), they are no one's responsibility and are not *citizens* in the sense of being able to claim the recognition of rights or entitlements from a state (Scott 1998). In the modern world this is tantamount to saying that they do not exist. And people who do not exist cannot be educated, cannot be planned for, cannot be *developed* (Scott 1998).

Whether the quality of life of rural people is any worse than that of urban slum dwellers is a moot point (Parnell 2005; Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2007). Granted that, on the face of it, the rural areas are poorer, the fact is that countryside dwellers usually have access to the *means of food production* (except perhaps in very severe droughts) and *survivalist* assets which their urban counterparts do not have. The cost of living in rural areas may be very low indeed, partly because there is frequently very little to buy and next to nothing by way of services. But it is invariably the case that the rural is more deprived than the urban in terms of access to healthcare, education, information, institutions of government, and so on (African Development Bank 2002). Another characteristic of rural areas is environmental degradation. This will be dealt with more fully in the following section.

THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES

At the outset it must be said that the neglect and environmental degradation of the rural areas is often attributable to a policy *void* as opposed to its being the outcome of any deliberate policy.

This policy void is evident in South African municipalities' lack of any coherent master plan to manage their municipal commonage where a classical *tragedy of the commons*'



type situation has frequently been allowed to develop (Cartwright, Harrison and Benseler 2004; Atkinson 2007). Given the land degradation that certain municipalities' failure to act is causing, it is difficult to see why the responsible municipal officials and council office bearers are not prosecuted in terms of South Africa's *National Environmental Management Act*, 107 of 1998 (NEMA) for failing to exercise their *duty of care* towards the environment. This merely exemplifies another distinctively African phenomenon – a tendency to over-regulate without the means of enforcing the regulations, and despite the bloated bureaucracies that are created to do so. Hugon (2004:40) points to the Central Marketing Board in Ghana which employed over ten thousand people and which wastefully “appropriated half of the value added in the cocoa industry”. As Clarke (2012:74–5) rather tartly observes: “Many state structures in effect act against what could be seen as the public interest... Many are employed in Africa's state bureaucracies; fewer work for them”.

The phenomenon of urban bias was referred to earlier and Auty (1995:34–5) is surely correct in seeing this as a logical consequence of *internal colonialism* – namely “the domination by a privileged minority of a dependent majority”. In the context of urban bias however, it is instructive that this is no one-way street, and that scholars sometimes perceive a *rural* bias in African governments' policy making (Hugon 2004) which often serves to keep destructive and uncompetitive agricultural practices viable in the short term. Hugon (2004:39) for example claims that, “increases in agricultural production, with rare exceptions [South Africa being one], came about through the extension of acreage and not through an improvement in yields”. This form of protectionism (allowing *extensive* as opposed to insisting on *intensive* agriculture) is partly to blame for the serious environmental degradation commented on by Auty (1995) in the Sahel. Following Hugon (2004:66), “cattle owners inhabiting the Sahel destroy their environment to try to slow down their own destruction” – thus another *tragedy of the commons* scenario writ large.

As for *rural bias* in South Africa, there is arguably an *a priori* anti-urban bias in government's expenditure on entitlement programmes. This is because rural areas have enjoyed a systematic advantage in entitlement-based expenditure. Rural areas have benefited disproportionately, due to the ostensibly larger proportion of the poor living in rural areas, and because national government's fiscal allocations are based on poverty indicators. Although this form of rural bias has tended not to translate into actual rural delivery the point is that where determining poverty thresholds, one size does not fit all, and a uniform threshold in fact tends to penalize urban households. A state pension also goes further in a rural area than it does in an urban setting where accommodation costs are usually much higher.

The World Bank (2000:170) sums up the assessment of government policy as it affects African rural areas very broadly as follows:

Centuries of poor policies and institutional failures are the primary cause of Africa's undercapitalized and uncompetitive agriculture. Adverse resource endowments have also had some direct effects, as well as indirect effects through their influence on policy. The lack of a prolonged period of favourable incentives, rural public investments, and institutional supports has limited the opportunities for African farmers and agro-industrialists.

Any way forward for the development of rural areas is going to rest on decisively combating rural poverty and this in turn implies an economic transformation of some description. As

economic transformation is critically dependent on government policy this discussion will now turn to some of the factors government policy could affect and which might facilitate the necessary transformation.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

The ideas expressed in this section presuppose political stability. In a context of endemic civil strife and *warlordism* the battle for economic rejuvenation will have been lost before it has begun, and rural poverty reduction will be delayed for years, if not decades (Collier 2007). Zimbabwe in the 1980s and Botswana are good examples of what can be achieved where political stability reigns (Hugon 2004).

The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto was hosted by the South African Department of Housing which was drawn to some of the ideas espoused by him in his influential *The Mystery of Capital* (De Soto 2000). The Department was interested in unlocking the estimated R68-billion of value that state-supplied housing represents in South Africa by mobilising a secondary market in this housing stock (Rust 2004). De Soto (2000) has advanced the notion of *dead capital* and has valued at US\$390-billion the land which farmers in Africa cultivate or graze their livestock on, but do not formally own. The importance of activating this so-called dead capital can be inferred from the following:

[In African countries] property rights are rarely secure. Most African peasants do not own the land they cultivate. In some countries the state owns all the land. In others, individual ownership is allowed but, because of an over-prescriptive and under-competent bureaucracy, it can take ten years and untold hassle to obtain formal title... This matters enormously. Lack of clear ownership means that poor Africans cannot use their property as collateral in order to obtain loans. Without access to credit, farmers find it hard to afford the tools and seeds that might make them more productive, and would-be entrepreneurs [for which read 'agriculturalists'] find it hard to get started... "dead capital"... is property which cannot be capitalized because of the lack of a title deed (Guest 2004:15).

Duncan Clarke (2012:152–3) also bemoans Africa's "high dependence on rudimentary agrarian pursuits and heavy reliance on one key asset: land resources" – an asset which is neutralised by a lack of "tradable qualities, transaction potential and instruments for monetizing wealth". Clarke is gloomy about future prospects and concludes that "it will probably take the rest of the century, maybe longer, for fully fledged land markets to develop across Africa". But it is doubtful that Africa can afford to wait that long for as Rukuni (2011:220) points out: "Natural resources managed as common property now face severe degradation in most African countries".

To implement what De Soto is proposing in Africa would therefore constitute the equivalent of a cultural revolution in that it would necessitate a decisive break with traditional notions of land tenure. And this may be precisely what is called for – a cultural revolution that will usher in an economic one (although for dissenting views see Cousins *et al.* 2005; and Rukuni 2011 who argue that traditional tenure need not be any less secure than private tenure).



Twineyo-Kamigisha (2012:119) details the advantages of land registration for agriculturalists as follows:

- It stimulates a more efficient use of the land... and removes disincentives to invest in the longer-term management and productivity of the land.
- It enables the creation of a land market allowing land to be transferred from less to more dynamic farmers
- It provides farmers with a title that can be offered as collateral
- It provides government with information... which can provide the basis for a system of property taxes.

He maintains that, as matters stand at present, too many small farmers fail to treat their land as the asset it would be, had they individual title to it (Twineyo-Kamigisha 2012:121). Insofar as experience in Thailand can be generalised to Africa, there appears to be empirical evidence in support of Twineyo-Kamigisha's contentions about land registration. In 1984 in Thailand five-million hectares were allocated to 8,5-million titles. By 2000 it was "found that the land was yielding larger harvests, selling at higher prices, and giving its owners access to credit" (Rice 2011:139).

Clarke (2012:3,91), in his analysis of how Africa's economic evolution is still too beholden to its past, observes that "Africa has long fallen behind the rest of the world in economic terms. The gap has widened with time... there has been no quantum leap out of past trajectories... out of the slow and gradual emergence from the modern past". Mills (2010:15,41) too maintains that traditional systems of land tenure have "been an impediment to entrepreneurship where they have hindered the collateralisation of land value through individual ownership" and he calls for "a change in outlook on the manner in which property is viewed" as a precondition to economic growth.

Revolution may beget revolution and indeed there is another revolution that is called for. This is actively to pursue the very best that modern technology and research has to offer. Mills (2010:42) deems technology to be "the main determinant of development advantage". Africa, by creatively and productively partnering with donor countries as mentors, could insinuate itself into a position at the *cutting edge* of innovation in the fields of genetics, microbiology and bio-technology (Worldwatch Institute 2011). Although "a lot of energy is spent gathering best practice examples from around the globe... these are seldom adapted and applied" (Mills 2010:174). Just as Africa needs to shake off the dead hand of the past (Clarke 2012) it should desist from saying 'no' to the future (Mills 2010). Here one has in mind something along the lines of India's *green revolution* (Auty 1995; Mills 2010). As Auty (1995) points out, Zimbabwe made promising progress in just such a direction in 1985 but unfortunately this was nullified by the anarchy property rights subsequently descended into. Hugon (2004:40-1,45) makes several important points when he writes:

Contrary to current thinking, Africa in general does not suffer from insufficient food production... production meets demand. Most food shortages are the result... of the absence of rights for certain groups... There are certainly problems of production, but the root cause of the agricultural crisis can be located largely outside of agriculture: it is situated upstream (lack of fertilizer, seed, technique) and downstream (marketing, transport, stockpiling, secure outlets) of agricultural production... Due to a lack of infrastructure and transport networks,

African economies remain disjointed: they consist of subsystems that do not communicate fully at the level of economic flows, prices and information.

These sentiments are echoed by Rukuni (2011:208) who finds that “agro ecosystems in sub-Saharan Africa are severely constrained by factors such as droughts, poor infrastructure, undeveloped input and output markets, as well as weak governance and institutions”. In referring to Africa’s having foregone a *green revolution* and the urgent need for some such equivalent, Clarke (2012:16,71) reveals that “without major agrarian improvements and reform” the *food insecure* of sub-Saharan Africa will exceed 500-million (more than half the population) by 2020.

There exists a whole host of conventional catalysts for economic growth that may be instrumental in securing a healthy functioning economy (Norton and Alwang 1993). All of these, such as an ethos of capital accumulation, as opposed to simply creaming off rents, are assumed to come into play once the engine of an economy (private property rights) has been engaged. What then are the additional factors that can be distilled from the foregoing discussion? They all have a *freeing-up*, liberating component and can be summarised as a willingness:

- to *think outside of the box*, by institutionalising private property (Mills 2010), and by “having the courage to do things that have never been done before” (Rukuni 2011:228);
- to replace a *zero-sum thinking* mind-set with one of *growing the cake* (Pike *et al.* 2010);
- to kickstart the trading markets (both upstream and downstream of agricultural production) that are the lifeblood of commerce and that will actualise rural potentialities while re-connecting segments of the economy with one another (Hugon 2004);
- to empower rural people by helping them to *represent* their assets so as to render them *negotiable*. Give people something to lose. As De Soto (2000:55) argues, “Because [rural people in developing countries] have no property to lose, they are taken seriously as contracting parties only by their immediate families and neighbours. People with nothing to lose are trapped in the grubby basement of the pre-capitalist world”.

A WAY FORWARD FOR RURAL AFRICA

As intimated in an earlier section, apropos of the Human Development Index, development calls for a whole host of necessary but not sufficient conditions to cohere before it can *happen*. This is to say that it must occur on many fronts simultaneously (e.g. gender equality, infrastructure, health, administration) and that no single element (say, education) is *sufficient* on its own to bring about development. This even applies to massively increased GDP which, in isolation from other developmental variables, is no guarantor of development (although of course it ought to help).

That said, if one waits for a *lead variable* to reveal itself and make the running, one might wait a very long time indeed. Arguably what is needed is a catalysing shock to the system – a spark that ignites the engine just as one starts a vehicle before all the mechanisms kick into gear.

The following section will explore just one such *shock* that might lend impetus to Africa’s rural renewal. But it presupposes *liberated* economies in which rural people



have a direct interest in the potential economic fruits of their labour and where mere subsistence on someone else's land has been shown as a recipe for lifelong poverty and economic stagnation.

FREE TRADE

Greg Mills (2010:155) accounts "openness to the international economy" as a "*sine qua non* for growth". Fonseca (2012:195), however, asks whether there is no end "to the hypocrisy that asks poor developing states of the South to reduce all tariffs and open their markets, while the developed states of the North, at the same time, maintain their own tariff barriers and deny market access?" It is common knowledge that the West harbours considerable guilt about the subsidies it pays its farmers and which render products from the developing world uncompetitive in those markets (Glover 2006). This is a guilt that Africa might exploit to the full.

The world does not owe Africa a living but Africa is entitled to a fair chance to participate in global markets. Fonseca (2012:191) maintains that "the institutions that govern world trade have an inherent bias towards the North and severely disadvantage the South". As Rukuni (2011:229) argues, "Make trade open, transparent and fair for African smallholder farmers". Nagar (2012) reports that in 2001, "rich countries agricultural subsidies amounted to \$311-bn". These subsidies "continue to hamper Africa's development prospects, particularly given that 70% of Africa's population works in this sector".

The Economist (2003b:13–4) summed up the failure of the Cancun round of trade negotiations as follows:

For all the fine promises made at Doha, rich countries could see no farther than the interests of their own farmers. America's unwillingness to curb its cotton subsidies—which have an especially severe effect on poor-country producers – is unforgivable. So too is Japan's unyielding defence of its own swaddled rice farmers. And for all its ballyhooed efforts at reform, the European Union remains the most egregious farm subsidizer of all....

The Economist points out, rich countries did not wreck Cancun by themselves. Many poor countries saw compromise as all take and no give and were unwilling to lower their own trade barriers (also see Mills 2010:49–51 for a fuller account). This finding is echoed by Fonseca (2012:238) who, notwithstanding his championing of the developing world's case, admits that "poor countries, too, bear some responsibility for the deadlock. For some, anti-rich-country rhetoric became more important than efforts to reach any agreement". In this regard Africa might consider taking the initiative by proactively opening its own markets and insisting that rich countries abandon their subsidies.

As analysts repeatedly point out, Africa's salvation lies in trade, not aid (Bauer 2000; *Economist* 2003a; Collier 2007; Mills 2010; Twineyo-Kamugisha 2012). Mills (2010:62–3) sums up the situation succinctly enough when he says that "the 'rules' for success and prosperity in the global economy... remain constant for all: innovate, produce and trade". Fonseca (2012:194) writes that "as recent history demonstrates so well, limiting trade can lead to a vicious circle with disastrous consequences".

Mills (2010:48) reports that “the average GDP of developing countries which were ‘always open’ [to trade] was, in 2006, \$17 521; while it was \$2 362 in the ‘always closed’ group”. According to Tren and Urbach (2012), “The empirical evidence is clear: as countries open their borders and increase their levels of economic freedom, their citizens become healthier and wealthier”. Encouragingly Tren and Urbach also observe that “African entrepreneurs, farmers and traders are better able to... trade across borders than ever before” and that this is starting to pay dividends. De Wet (2012) too is optimistic that Africa is moving in the right direction and reports that there is broad agreement that to attain food security “easier trade between countries” is required.

But this sanguine outlook is tempered by Mills (2010:13) who attributes the fact that “African countries have avoided putting in place the correct policies and procedures to facilitate trade” to the part played by *vested interests* who profit from maintaining the *status quo*.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing review article has of necessity confined itself to a limited number of aspects with a bearing on Africa’s future agricultural trajectory. This self-imposed selectivity is not intended to detract from other weighty variables. Depending on analysts’ backgrounds compelling cases both can and should be made for factors such as more efficient irrigation regimes; food biodiversity; rainwater harvesting; solutions to the soil fertility crisis; urban agriculture; empowering women farmers; resilience to climate change; the potential for value-adding; integrated value chains; infrastructural deterioration, and so forth (Ingle 2006; Worldwatch Institute 2011). The list is a long and daunting one but it has the merit of allowing for agricultural revitalisation to be undertaken simultaneously on many fronts, by many interested parties from commercial farmers to gender activists, from politicians to bureaucrats, from teachers to business people from academics to NGOs.

Rukuni (2011:230) quite correctly maintains that “agriculture is the backbone of the African economy and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future”. But it is critical that Africa renews and strengthens this backbone if it is not to buckle under the crushing demands of the future. Africa needs to revisit certain restrictive methods and institutions of the past, especially insofar as these affect land ownership, in order to unlock the value that is tied up in its rural natural resource assets. Using this released value to lubricate the wheels of trade, the rural areas need to capitalise on their comparative advantage over urban areas (food production) by embracing new technologies, by agitating for and subscribing to new trading regimes, and by exploiting these to the full. But none of this can come to pass without properly directed assistance, political stability and good governance (Mills 2010). This is in keeping with Rukuni’s (2011:207) admonition that, “agricultural development can no longer be divorced from issues of democracy, politics and governance on the continent”.

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